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[82]  Jacques Cujas  (1522-1590).  Jurisconsulte  humaniste, by Xavier  Prevost,  Geneva,  Droz,
2016), 592pp, €93.84 (hbk), ISBN 978-2-600-01814-2. 
This  book is  a  reworked thesis  which  was defended at  the  Sorbonne University  in  2012.  The
hardcopy comes without appendices but these can be downloaded for free from the publisher's site.
In this work, the author intends to reposition the thought of the legal humanist Jacques Cujas (1522-
1590)  within  the  context  of  sixteenth-century  legal  humanism  (14).  He  aims  to  do  so  by  a
systematic study of the jurist's' entire work (12). This very ambitious project has resulted in a book
divided into three parts: (i) a prolegomena which provides Cujas' biography and bibliography, (ii) a
part which discusses Cujas' humanist approach to law, and (iii) the final part of the book which
focuses on the practical dimensions of Cujas' legal writings. 
Central to the book are two issues. First, the author intends to investigate to what extent
Cujas' approach to law differed from that of his medieval predecessors. Though the long-held view
that humanist scholarship presented a fundamental breach with medieval scholarship has already
been dismissed as over-simplified, the author nevertheless sees its refutation as the main purpose of
his  book (10).  He wishes  to  nuance  the  simplified dichotomy between medieval  and humanist
scholarship which incessantly repeats itself in today's reference books (11). 
Secondly, the author assesses the practical character of Cujas' work. Indeed, humanist legal
scholarship has always been shrouded in mystery when it comes to its influence on legal practice in
particular. It is difficult to demonstrate the degree to which humanist scholarship had a formative
impact on how justice was distributed in court.  Some scholars contend that such influence was
absent. The humanists' ivory-tower erudition was no more than a pedantic display of knowledge
which did not  have  any bearing  on what  happened in  the  real  world.1 Others  propose  a  more
nuanced  view, arguing  that  it  was  not  so  much  its  direct  influence  on  decision-making  as  its
different mode of reasoning by which humanist scholarship thoroughly changed the way law was
perceived and applied.2 This book goes somewhat further. In addition to the view that humanist [83]
scholarship altered the perception of law, the author contends that the works of Cujas were put to
the service of legal practice (15). 
The author discusses the two mentioned issues by means of a full-scale investigation of
Cujas' writings (12). Moreover, in order to answer the posed questions properly, the author argues
that the context within which Cujas worked needs to be restored. This makes, in his view, Cujas'
biography  indispensable.  Consequently,  the  prolegomena  provides  the  reader  with  a  thorough
chronological description of the vicissitudes of Cujas' life. Archival records complete and nuance
the  portrait  offered  in  older  biographies.  Furthermore,  the  author  presents  a  full  and  detailed
bibliography of Cujas' works. The treatment of the standard edition for Cujas' work, Fabrot's Opera
omnia, is particularly informative (123ff). The reader learns much about the method employed by
Fabrot  to  produce a  reliable  edition,  which  includes  comparing  Cujas'  manuscripts  with earlier
1 W Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien durch die wissenschaftliche Lehre (Koehlers Antiquarium,
1938) 242.
2 P Stein, 'Legal Humanism and Legal Science' (1986) 54 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 300; GCJJ Van den 
Bergh, Die holländische elegante Schule (Vittorio Klostermann, 2002) 37.
editions of his writings (124). Overall, the extensive treatment of the various editions of Cujas' work
provide researchers with useful insights into their quality and reliability. 
Yet, despite the impressive result of the author's work on Cujas' biography and bibliography,
it may be questioned whether all this contributes to addressing the issues which the author aims to
tackle. The need for a renewed biography of Cujas is defended with the somewhat opaque argument
that in order to penetrate the thought of a writer one needs to look at his life (13). Admittedly, the
context  in  which  a  legal  mode  of  thinking  develops  is  necessary  for  its  correct  interpretation.
However, such a context consists of a lot more than a writer's biography. The case can be made that
when discussing legal humanism against the backdrop of medieval scholarship, a definition and
explanation of the latter's features are required. What methodological assumptions did medieval
scholars adopt? What did medieval legal practice look like? The book, however, fails to address
these questions. This becomes all the more urgent, since the author compares Cujas' humanism and
medieval  legal  science  and speculates  on the  influence  Cujas  exercised  on contemporary  legal
practice in which the  mos Italicus  still firmly held ground.3 The author does not go beyond the
somewhat  outdated view that  'the bartolists  essentially  contented themselves  with repeating the
solutions developed by their predecessors' (5). Given that biographies of Cujas already exist, the
reader  can  hardly  avoid  the  question  whether  the  biographical  part  should  not  have  been kept
shorter in order to leave more room for an in-depth elaboration of the characteristics of medieval
legal scholarship. This would possibly have enabled the author to draw more marked conclusions
about the character of Cujas' scholarly work vis-à-vis that of his medieval colleagues. 
Having discussed life and works of Cujas in the prolegomena, the first part of the book
continues with a substantive analysis of Cujas' work. The author focuses in particular on Cujas'
bringing to perfection the historical analysis of the law (133). Contrary to what some scholars posit,
this  fundamental  trait  of  humanist  [84] scholarship  does  not,  according  to  the  author,  entail  a
wholesale breach with medieval scholarship (138). In this regard, the author puts special emphasis
on  Cujas'  ample  use  of  the  interpretations  of  Justinianic  law  by  medieval  glossators.  Their
interpretations form the basis of ius commune-doctrine which Cujas tests against the results of his
historical scrutiny (144). Backed by a quantitative analysis of the sources Cujas' draws from when
interpreting Roman law, the author demonstrates that the humanist interprets the existing body of
Roman law texts with the help of  everything he could find,  including the writings  of the first
Bolognese interpreters. Yet, Cujas goes further than these by using Greek texts (the accents and
aspirations of which the book under review often renders incorrect, as the footnotes on 206-207),
grammatical analyses and historical knowledge to reach a correct interpretation of the law texts. It is
in the latter that the author observes a marked difference with medieval scholarship (156). 
Cujas' predilection for the work of the glossators has already been noted by other scholars
such  as  Flach.4 Our  author,  however,  carries  the  matter  further.  As  additional  proof  of  Cujas'
indebtedness to medieval scholarship he highlights the humanist's many favourable references to
Bartolus, the most renowned of the commentators (165). Though Cujas sporadically criticizes him,
the author ascribes that to the commentator's methodological deficiencies in the particular legal
issue at hand (176), not to a wholesale condemnation of Bartolus' work. The author strongly rejects
the tendency to put Cujas on a par with other anti-bartolist humanists (181). In sum, Cujas proves to
be an eclectic, undogmatic scholar who is averse to taking authoritative opinions for granted but
3 See Stein (n 2) 305.
4 J Flach, 'Cujas, les glossateurs et les bartolistes' (1883) 7 Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger 205. 
who at the same time is not afraid to credit his medieval predecessors when their solutions conform
to his own views (231).      
The second chapter of the first part of the book provides an in-depth discussion of Cujas'
efforts to restore the text of the Corpus iuris civilis to its original state. Cujas' approach consists in
bringing  manuscripts  together  (collatio)  and  correcting  the  vulgate  text  where  necessary
(emendatio) in order to be able to reach a sound interpretation (interpretatio). The author provides
the  reader  with  sundry  examples  of  how  Cujas  scrutinized  manuscripts  and  Greek  unglossed
constitutions to achieve a better understanding of the Roman law in all its stages, which approach
constituted something new in comparison with medieval legal scholarship (276, 303). 
The chapter  continues  with  the treatment  of  how Cujas  reconstructs  the  writings  of  the
Roman jurists out of the fragments of the Corpus iuris civilis. Contrary to the often-heard opinion in
modern scholarship that Cujas attempted to reconstruct classical law, it is here convincingly argued
that  that  was not  Cujas'  main purpose.  He strived for  a  correct  reconstruction of the evolution
Roman  law  had  experienced  through  history  (328).  All  this  served  the  sole  purpose  of  better
interpreting the law and of correcting its flawed interpretations, be they introduced by [85] Cujas'
predecessors or his contemporary humanist colleagues (330). Cujas even went so far as to bring in
Carolingian  capitularia  to back his arguments (336). Still,  the casuistic manner in which Cujas
worked (341) and his reason for reinterpreting the law, - the wish to solve contradictions in the
corpus Justinianeum (346) - proves his affinity with the medieval legal mind.    
The second part of the book is devoted to the practical dimensions of Cujas' work. In this
part's first chapter, the author explores the practical depth of the humanist's writings. He does so by
investigating Cujas' consilia, which according to the author, 'give a strong testimony of his activity
as practitioner' (361). From the sixty consilia which have been handed over in Cujas' Opera omnia,
the author discusses those dealing with the law of succession (363). The focus mainly lies on two
sources of contemporary positive law which Cujas frequently used to interpret the issues at hand;
customary law (396) and royal statutes (404). After a meticulous analysis, the author reaches the
conclusion that the Romanist appears to be a true practitioner (436). 
The second chapter of the book's second part continues with Cujas' treatment of feudal law.
Medieval legal scholarship had added 'the books on feudal law (Libri feudorum)' to the Corpus iuris
civilis  so that they became part  of the main body of law that was studied at  the medieval law
faculties. According to the author, Cujas in his commentaries to the  Libri feudorum  again gives
proof  of  the  practical  dimension of  his  work (438).  Indeed,  as  the  author  demonstrates,  Cujas
frequently compares Lombard law with French customary law governing the bonds between lords
and vassals (483). However, whether this is enough to prove that 'Cujas' historical humanism is not
incompatible with legal practice', as the author states (499), can be questioned.   
First, it is not clear what the author understands by legal practice. No definition is given. Yet,
before being able to make statements about Cujas' relationship to legal practice the reader should be
informed about what is meant by the latter. Remarks such as that 'Cujas' historical humanism is not
incompatible with legal practice (499)' are otherwise difficult to comprehend. In my opinion, 'legal
practice' is what legal practitioners do, eg writing pleas, pronouncing sentences and issuing decrees.
In this book it does not become clear to what extent Cujas' work related to these activities. Were his
consilia used  in  court  by  parties  under  litigation?  Did  Cujas'  writings  serve  judges  in  their
sentencing? Did rulers in their law-making activities take notice of what the humanist wrote on the
law of succession or feudal law or ask for his advice? The book provides no answers to these and
similar questions. The author rather seems to equate writing about contemporary positive law with
directly influencing it.  In doing so, he passes over the intriguing question of whether humanist
scholarship was taken into consideration by practitioners at all, or, even more tantalizing, whether
humanists themselves saw any practical purpose to their work. 
In particular, the nature of Cujas'  consilia leaves many questions unanswered. They often
lack case-specific facts and rarely cite ius commune-doctrine. Taking into account that in Cujas' age
the  mos  Italicus-method  still  prevailed  in  legal  [86] practice  and  that  Roman  law  in  its  ius
commune-clothing  was  a  source  of  law, whereas  reconstructed  Roman  law was  not,  it  is  very
unlikely that  consilia in this form could have been of much practical use. A comparison between
Cujas'  consilia and those of his contemporaries might have been revealing. If we consider eg the
various consilia written about the succession to the Portuguese throne, it appears, that Cujas' two-
folio-long  consilium (425ff)  widely  differs  from  those  given  by  contemporary  scholars  which
consist of tens of pages and abound with references to  ius commune-sources.5 One might wonder
whether Cujas' consilium contained any persuasive power. Perhaps the succession to the Portuguese
throne rather posed an attractive legal puzzle for a humanist interested in testing his purified version
of Roman law to a contemporary succession case.
In short, both the claim that Cujas' historical humanism is compatible with legal practice and
the  opposite,  that  it  is  not,  may  be  correct.  The  present  study  just  does  not  provide  enough
information  for  a  definite  answer  to  this  question.  A thorough  exposition  of  the  specifics  of
medieval scholarship would have enabled the author to adopt a firmer position on the practical
character of Cujas' consilia and his writings on feudal law. As things now stand, it seems as if the
author equates Cujas'  writing about the law in force with directly influencing its  application in
practice. Yet, whether such influence existed is exactly what should have been investigated. That
theorizing about the law does not necessarily have an effect on its practical workings is a fact not
many scholars would dare to deny.
To conclude, this book proves a treasure trove for every scholar who ventures on a journey
over the tricky path of legal humanism. Though the analysis of the practical character of Cujas'
work leaves room for critical comments, the book nonetheless offers valuable reference material
accompanied by thorough analyses. The work done on Cujas' biography is impressive. The author
delved deep into the archives to correct flaws in older biographies about Cujas' life. Similarly, the
overview of the various existing editions of Cujas'  works renders this book a valuable work of
reference which no future scholar seriously writing about Cujas can dispense with. Finally, the in-
depth discussion of Cujas' treatment of the law of succession and of feudal law give the reader a
rare insight into a humanist legal mind. It can only be wished for that more humanist scholars will
receive similar attention, as there still  remains much to explore in the intriguing world of legal
humanism.
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5 Eg Miguel de Aguirre's Responsum de successione regni Portugalliae pro Philippo Hispaniarum Rege (Venice, 1581), 
counts 108 folia. Luis de Molina y Morales' Iuris allegatio pro Rege Catholico Philippo II ad successionem Regnorum 
Portugalliae (np, 1579) counts 52.
